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Neoliberal approaches to managing animal disease use Market Instruments (MIs) to promote biosecurity
citizenship amongst farmers. MIs create risk-based trading markets that make disease risks visible, and
establish and reward appropriate farming practices. However, for other policies the use of MIs is often
context dependent and related to farmers' existing values and practices. This paper considers how
different spatial imaginations of disease and place attachment amongst farmers modiﬁes the meaning of
disease control MIs. Using the example of bovine Tuberculosis in New Zealand, the paper examines its
Risk Based Trading scheme known as ‘C status’ designed to limit the movement of cattle. Drawing on
qualitative interviews in a farming community in the West Coast, the paper shows how farmers accept
the legitimacy of C status to create biosecurity citizenship. At the same time, farmers recognise different
spaces of disease risk that vary according to landscape and climate, farming practices, and cattle genetics:
factors not recognised within C status. These absences, together with farmers' attachment to place, and
their adaptive plans to live with disease, can minimise the signiﬁcance of MIs.
© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
This paper explores the role of Market Instruments (MIs) in
creating and encouraging biosecurity citizenship amongst farmers
to prevent the spread of animal disease. Market Instruments (MIs)
e codes of practice, environmental management systems, envi-
ronmental certiﬁcation, and ﬁnancial incentives e are commonly
used to secure environmental beneﬁts and encourage positive
environmental behaviours amongst land owners and farmers
(Dibden and Cocklin, 2005; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). Increas-
ingly, MIs are employed in the management of animal disease to
create risk-based trading markets for cattle in which disease-free
livestock can attract ﬁnancial premiums. At the same time, MIs
can help reduce the spread of disease by establishing and
rewarding forms of ‘good farming’ and normative behaviours
which act as forms of social control (cf. Burton, 2004).
Whilst studies have examined farmers' responses to MIs for a
range of agricultural policies, there are no social science studies
that examine their use in managing animal disease. More generally,
Higgins et al. (2012) suggest that further research is required to
understand how MIs are used in practice, how they are resisted orLtd. This is an open access articleadapted, and how existing values, knowledges and practices
interact with and reshape policies. This is also true for animal
disease MIs: they articulate speciﬁc epidemiological un-
derstandings of animal disease articulated at different spatial scales
(such as the farm, parish or region) yet farmers' disease manage-
ment practices may be informed by understandings of disease that
are rooted in place-based experiences (see for example: Enticott,
2008).
This paper therefore asks to what extent do place-based un-
derstandings of animal disease correspond with and support the
aims of animal disease MIs? The paper focuses on the management
of bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) in New Zealand where a system of MIs
is used to limit the movements of potentially infected cattle. The
paper begins by reviewing the role of MIs, linking them to Barker's
(2010) concept of biosecurity citizenship. Drawing on interviews
with farmers in the West Coast, New Zealand, the paper describes
the role of place in shaping farmers' understandings of bTB, and
how their spatial understandings of disease transmission support
and conﬂict with the aims of MIs designed to prevent its spread.2. Biosecurity and market instruments
Biosecurity e or measures taken to eliminate and prevent the
spread of animal disease e is central to the neoliberal project of theunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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The neoliberal governance of biosecurity relies on the creation of
standards and technologies to patrol inter- and national borders
(Higgins and Dibden, 2011). At the same time, the neoliberal
governance of animal disease has sought to pass the costs, duties
and responsibilities of biosecurity to farmers by creating new
partnership governance structures. In countries like Australia and
New Zealand, the agricultural industry takes the lead in funding
and governing the eradication of speciﬁc animal diseases with the
State representing a minority partner.
Biosecurity is also devolved to individual farmers through spe-
ciﬁc technologies of rule designed to individualise biosecurity re-
sponsibilities by creating new biosecurity subjectivities. Drawing
on Rose's (2007) notion of ‘biological citizenship’ and ideas of
‘ecological citizenship’ (Dobson, 2003), Barker (2010) suggests that
the creation of biosecure citizenship involves ‘symbiotic individu-
alisation’ in which a variety of technologies of persuasion and
enforcement are used to encourage citizens to think about and act
upon their individual biosecurity responsibilities. Thus, technolo-
gies of rule identify appropriate practices that seek to create
‘contractual obligations’ for citizens to participate in the surveil-
lance and reporting of unwanted biological presences.
Thinking about biosecurity citizenship and the governance of
the self therefore alerts us to the technologies and rationalities
required to normalise pro-biosecurity practices. Market In-
struments are a prime example. The growing use of MIs stems from
a general dissatisfaction with old policy instruments, the rise of
governance paradigms based in neoliberal institutionalism and the
desire to regulate without challenging free-trade or subsidising
production (Higgins et al., 2012). In practice, MIs are a diverse set of
instruments, ranging from direct taxation, cap and trade schemes,
certiﬁcation and labelling, and payments for ecosystem services
(Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). According to Lockie (2013), MIs will
differ according to policy objectives and can take three forms:
‘market friction’ MIs seek to improve existing markets by providing
information that allows product differentiation, such as certiﬁca-
tion schemes and standards; ‘price-based’ mechanisms set or
modify prices to incorporate the cost of ecosystem services through
auctions, tenders grants and taxes; and ‘quantity based’ MIs set
targets to achieve or maintain environmental goals through cap
and trade mechanisms.
In the regulation of animal disease, MIs are commonly associ-
ated with policies of Risk Based Trading (RBT). RBT seeks to regulate
the movement of livestock between different places e deﬁned by
either institutional or epidemiological boundaries. RBT schemes
can be either statutory or voluntary, and seek to shape farmers'
livestock purchasing practices by providing accurate information
on disease risks in order to “encourage farmers to consider the
relative disease risk of animals that they are buying, empower them
to make better informed cattle trading decisions, and take greater
responsibility formanaging the [disease] risk of their herd as part of
wider efforts to stop the spread of [disease]” (Bovine TB Risk Based
Trading Group, 2013). RBTs therefore act as a market friction MI,
attempting to improve the efﬁciency of existing markets through
the provision of information. Frequently, they take the form of
certiﬁcation schemes, herd classiﬁcations and disease ratings in
order tomake disease risks visible, and create amarket for different
levels of disease risk. In seeking to robustly deﬁne and measure
animal disease risks, RBTs can be seen to be part of a ‘metrological
regime’ (Barry, 2002) through which metrics are key components
in the shaping of calculative economic behaviour (Çalıs¸kan and
Callon, 2010). Equally, the metrological systems inherent to RBTs
contribute to Barker's concept of ‘symbiotic individualisation’. Their
focus is on rendering measurable and calculable aspects of farming
practices in order to allow farmers to identify where their conductcan be optimised (Higgins et al., 2012). In this way, MIs that rely on
standards and numerical inscriptions can be seen to ‘provide an
opportunity and obligation to demonstrate [a] ‘duty of care’’ (Lockie
and Higgins, 2007, p. 7). MIs therefore contribute to constructing
farmers as ‘entrepreneurial and ‘active’ agents who improve their
productivity without government interference’ (Lockie and
Higgins, 2007, p. 2).
The adoption and use of MIs is not without problems. Crucially,
MIs demand that their users put community interests before their
own. Tensions between existing values and attitudes, and the new
practices encouraged by MIs may lead to their non-adoption or
misuse. The use of MIs may ultimately be highly context-
dependent, and relate to the signiﬁcance of competing govern-
ment policies (Higgins et al., 2012). Whilst MIs may seek to deﬁne
and make new farming practices socially acceptable, Burton (2004)
shows that farmers possess their own symbolic codes of recog-
nising ‘good farming’ but which can also undermine government
attempts to persuade them to adopt different practices through, for
example, payments for ecosystem services. Studies of the adoption
of new farming practices also emphasise the extent to which
adoption is shaped by pre-existing values and attitudes, requiring
speciﬁc trigger events to break path-dependent approaches to
farming (Sutherland et al., 2012; Sutherland and Darnhofer, 2012).
Whilst there are no studies of how MIs have been used to help
regulate animal disease and create norms of biosecurity citizenship,
there is no reason to suspect that the fate of biosecurity MIs would
be any different to those policy areas where they have been used.
Recent biosecurity research suggests that the adoption of new
disease prevention practices is related to factors such as trust in
government (Enticott et al., 2014; Heffernan et al., 2008a) and is
dependent on existing cultural beliefs about disease (Heffernan
et al., 2008b; Maye et al., 2014). Farmers may resist the introduc-
tion of Government-led MIs, fearing disruption to the operation of
existing markets or the creation of ‘two-tier markets’ (Bovine TB
Risk Based Trading Group, 2013). Indeed, the establishment of
metrological systems e such as those contained within RBTs e is
well known for provoking debate and contestation due to the
precise difﬁculties of measurement, deﬁnition and commensura-
tion (Cooper, 2015). As Espeland and Stevens (1998) show, metro-
logical systems rely on aggregating different attributes, yet these
acts of commensuration depend on the extent to which people
accept these metrics legitimately express value, or the extent to
which disparate factors can be legitimately combined. Indeed,
farmers' own understanding of disease can be shaped by their own
place-based experiences of disease. The sharing of stories between
farmers about disease outbreaks, can contribute to the creation of
‘lay epidemiologies’ (Enticott, 2008) in which farmers make sense
of animal disease and draw up their own rules of good biosecure
farming. Farmers' lay epidemiologies can undermine government
attempts to persuade farmers to adopt new disease procedures by
highlighting how scientiﬁc understandings of disease fail to take
into account the local peculiarities of risk, landscape and place.
Whilst knowledge of these understandings of animal disease is
important, the extent to which they also shape the use of MIs in the
management of animal disease is not known. The remainder of this
paper therefore turns to an examination of farmers' reactions to a
MI used in New Zealand to limit the spread of animal disease, and
the extent to which place-based understandings of disease
contribute to its use.
3. Methodology
Bovine tuberculosis (bTB) is a zoonotic infection found in cattle,
wildlife (e.g. possums and badgers) and humans. The disease is
endemic in many countries and is ‘notiﬁable’ requiring any
G. Enticott / Journal of Rural Studies 45 (2016) 312e319314suspicion of its presence to be reported to government authorities.
For the purposes of controlling the international spread of bTB, the
World Organisation for Animal Health establishes the conditions
under which a country can declare itself bTB-free, and speciﬁes
disease surveillance practices that should be followed.
In New Zealand, bTB is managed by Operational Solutions for
Primary Industries (OSPRI), formerly known as the Animal Health
Board (AHB). The AHBwas established as an incorporated society in
1998, following the passing of New Zealand's 1993 Biosecurity Act.
The AHB takes the role of a Pest Management Agency, responsible
for writing and delivering the National Pest Management Strategy
for bTB (Hutchings et al., 2013). It was created as a partnership
between the farming industry and the national government, but in
which the agricultural industry has the majority stake due to its
larger ﬁnancial contribution. In this sense, the AHB represents a
classic organisational form resulting from so-called “roll-back”
neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell, 2002) common to agricultural re-
forms in New Zealand from the mid 1980s (Haggerty et al., 2009).
Since 1998, concerted disease control efforts by the AHB have
resulted in a steep decline in the national prevalence of bTB in cattle
herds which now stands at 0.21% (OSPRI, 2014). However, pockets
of persistent infection remain in some areas of the country
particularly in the West Coast region. One aspect of the disease
control programme has been the use of a RBT scheme designed to
limit the movements of cattle between infected and clean areas of
New Zealand. Statutory RBTs were part of the successful bTB
eradication scheme in Australia in which inter-state cattle move-
ments and farm to farm cattle sales were tightly regulated (More
et al., 2015).
By contrast, a voluntary RBT scheme was developed in New
Zealand, which reﬂected the involvement of farmers in its creation
and the governance of bTB. The system itself has changed over time,
but its origins can be traced to 1991 when the East Coast Regional
Animal Health Advisory Committee began insisting that any cattle
on sale in their saleyards would have to display information on the
herds' bTB status. The Board, led by Ross Bramwell, a local
auctioneer, together with other local farmers, had become con-
cerned about the number of cattle from regions of high bTB inci-
dence, such as the Wairarapa, being sold in Hawke's Bay and
translocating the disease. In these saleyards, farmers selling stock
were required to complete an Animal Status Declaration (ASD) card
which was displayed to farmers. Farmers from areas with high
levels of bTB were initially shocked by the requirements. However,
support from Hawke's Bay farmers ensured the scheme was a
success, and gradually the scheme was implemented in other re-
gions of New Zealand. As farmers' became increasingly involved in
the management of bTB through the establishment of the AHB, so
the scheme evolved into a nationwide RBT. The ASDs were replaced
by a metrological system inwhich every herd was given a risk score
which classiﬁed farms according to the number of years they have
been clear of bTB (e.g. C1, C2 through to C101) or infected (e.g. I1, I2
etc.). Status is conferred on high-ranking herds (e.g. C10) and pe-
nalises farmers purchasing cattle from herds with inferior bTB
status: were a C10 farm to buy cattle from a C5 herd, it would adopt
the lower status classiﬁcation. ‘C Status’ therefore operates as a
market friction MI, applying a risk metrics to the existing cattle
trading market through which premiums for disease-free cattle are
created, rewarding farmers who stay clear of disease, and incenti-
vising disease control measures by creating a visible rating of a
farmers' performance. Importantly, as the RBT was developed with1 Ofﬁcially, the highest status a herd can achieve is C10, however farmers will
often refer to herds having a higher C status, reﬂecting the importance of high
status, as well as the simplicity of the metrological system.farmers e alternative risk scores based on epidemiological calcu-
lations were rejected by farmers e the system also had the po-
tential to overcome farmer scepticism and problems of
commensuration common to other metrological systems.
To investigate how C Status informs farmers' disease manage-
ment practices, farmers in Karamea e a small farming community
in the West Coast region of New Zealand e were interviewed. The
West Coast has the highest prevalence of bTB in New Zealand:
approximately two-thirds of the cases in New Zealand are found
here (Animal Health Board, 2012). Karamea lies at the northern tip
of theWest Coast, 100 kms north of the nearest town eWestport e
and accessible by one road. At the time of the research, the area
contained 56 farms, 38 of which were dairy and the remainder beef.
Farms in Karamea have a long history of bTB and it has been rec-
ognised as a bTB problem area since the 1960s. The area is sur-
rounded by the Kahurangi National Park which provides the ideal
habitat for possums, known to spread bTB to cattle (Davidson,1991)
(see Map 1 for locations). At the time of the research, 11 farms were
infected with bTB and three were rated C10.
Karamea was therefore chosen as a unique case because of its
high levels of bTB andwhich allows the impact of MIs upon farmers
to be assessed. In total, 20 qualitative interviews were conducted
with farmers in Karamea. Because beef cattle are slaughtered at a
young age, beef producing farms are restricted to C2 status. To
account for the impact of the full range of C values, research
therefore focussed on dairy farms. All farmers interviewed had
experienced a bTB breakdown, and nine herds were infected at the
time of the interviews. The C status of farms without bTB ranged
from C1 to C5. Herd sizes ranged from 150 to 370. Three farmers
had recently retired from dairying but still maintained and rented
out land in Karamea for agricultural use. All but one of the active
farmers owned the farm with the remainder being a lower order
sharemilker.
Access was initially arranged through the West Coast bTB
Eradication Board with help from Animal Health Board ofﬁcials,
and snowball sampling was used to make contact with other Kar-
amea farmers. For additional context, a further 5 farmers were
interviewed on the West Coast, along with 10 interviews with vets
and ofﬁcials dealing with bTB on the West Coast. Interviews were
conducted in August and November 2012, and lasted between
40 min and 2 h. Interviews covered the history of bTB on each
farmers' farm and in Karamea, their understanding of the way the
disease spreads, and the role and meaning of C status. Interviews
were conducted on the farm. In nine cases, the interview consisted
of a farming couple (husband and wife or mother and son). The
remaining interviews were with male farmers. All interviews were
recorded and transcribed and coded in NVivo. Interviews were
conducted on the basis of strict conﬁdentiality and quotes used in
the analysis have been anonymised.
4. Analysis
The following sections provide an analysis of the impact of MIs
upon farmers' disease management practices. It begins by consid-
ering how MIs shape biosecurity citizenship by limiting the
movement of cattle from Karamea, before analysing how farmers'
place-based understandings of disease modify the meaning of C
status.
4.1. C status and the production of biosecurity citizenship
Farmers in Karamea readily deﬁned themselves using the C
classiﬁcation. Unprompted, they would describe their herd using
the C nomenclature and clearly understood that the higher the C
number, the better it was. Farmers recognised that it was rewarding
Map 1. Locations of the West Coast and Karamea in New Zealand.
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stock and move stock between different parcels of land. C status
was also useful in helping farmers make sense of the disease situ-
ation on their farm. A common narrative of bTB in Karameawas of a
constant cycle of infection followed by a clear period, before lapsing
back into infection:“We'll have a cow with TB and then you'll get your two clear tests
cos generally we get 2 clear tests after that and then we're off for
another 5 years. So its just something … yeah, it seems to be a 5
year cycle so we'll be due to go back on [laughs]” (KF5, bTB status:
C4, 180 cows)
2 In fact, farmers were referring to two hill ranges: the Karamea Bluff which
separates Karamea from the rest of the West Coast, and the Southern Alps which
G. Enticott / Journal of Rural Studies 45 (2016) 312e319316Moreover, C status became a central part of this narrative of
infection and cleanliness, providing a way of describing the time-
line of this cycle. For example, the chair of the West Coast bTB
Eradication Board described the situation like this:
“We just ended up in a cycle for a while of pure frustration e they'd
ﬁnd a reactor or a cull at the works and nothing, nothing, nothing.
You'd do your testing and get to C1 or 2 or maybe 3 or 4 and then
boom you'd fall over again, it just seemed to be quite a bunch of us
up here that would do this cycle: you're off, you're on, you're off,
you're on”
Farmers described how C status can play an important role in
guiding cattle purchasing decisions. They recounted how their C
status meant that farmers from outside Karamea were reluctant to
buy their cattle. Low C status invited questions from potential
purchases about the reasons why, or meant that business oppor-
tunities were abandoned or signiﬁcantly lost value:
“I have had questions asked about our situation e how come you
are only C3 that was a question I've got asked last year when I sold
some animals e how come you are only C3?” (KF6, bTB status: C3)
For farmers in Karamea, the of role C status to inspire biosecure
citizenship was entirely appropriate. They did not begrudge other
farmers use of C status as a way of informing their decisions and
suggested that they would do the same in their position. Moreover,
as well as limiting cattle movements, C status also had the effect of
encouraging other forms of biosecurity in an attempt to preserve C
status. Examples included ensuring that boundary fences were
secure to prevent stock frommingling with neighbours' that might
be infected:
“people that have managed to get their herds to C10 are jealously
guarding that …. It's a bit like having a neighbour with weeds you
know, you really, you really have got to watch that guy so I think
that people would be quite careful about having neighbours like
that and keeping their stock away from them” (KF15, bTB status:
infected, 340 cows)
Another farmer recounted a similar tale of attempts to protect
his C10 herd by erecting a shelter-belt to prevent his herd from
coming into contact with infected cattle on a neighbouring farm.
Interestingly, this farmer went on to describe how his C10 status
was regarded by other farmers in the area: whilst he argued that
C10 “didn't have to be important”, he recalled how other farmers had
sought out his advice to enhance their C status simply because he
was C10:
“they would always come to you and say well what are you doing
sort of thing, I'm infected at the moment and I don't know what I'm
going to do and you seem to be able to keep clear e usually it was
because they had stock away grazing or they might have bought in
a cow from somewhere else, it's just wee things, things the farmer
doesn't actually think about” (KF16, bTB status: infected, 220 cows)
Whilst farmers' accepted the logic of C Status, they also sought
to adapt it to ﬁt their own understandings of disease. Speciﬁcally,
farmers applied different temporal lenses to disease freedom in
which they set different levels of risk rather than the 1e10 scale
provided by C status. Rather than seeing a graduated scale of safety,
farmers in Karamea set two or three zones: C1 to C3 as being least
safe, followed by C3 to C10, with some setting another cut off at C5.
For farmers in Karamea that bought cattle, these cut offs wereapplied when using C status as a guide to assess which cattle to buy.
For example:
“The higher the status the better it would be for me buying animals
on the coast, I deﬁnitely wouldn't buy anything below a C5 or a C6
over here, yeah, deﬁnitely looking for that higher status, even if they
were a good animal and they were only a C2 C3 sort of thing I
wouldn't buy them, I wouldn't even look at them. Well, you are
running a risk of catching TB in your own herd” (KF16, bTB status:
infected, 220 cows)
The thresholds that farmers apply to C status show that farmers
remake MIs to suit their own understandings of disease. Interest-
ingly, the thresholds suggested are similar to those suggested by
veterinary experts when C status was ﬁrst introduced. Originally,
vets argued that there was no epidemiological reason for having
anything greater than C2. However, farmers pressed for a graduated
scale up to C10. Whilst these interviews suggest that the cut off for
farmers may be higher than C2, they nevertheless suggest that
farmers apply their own limits of safety to MIs.
In deﬁning and making disease risks visible to farmers, C status
therefore appears to contribute to the creation of biosecurity citi-
zenship amongst farmers in Karamea. At the very least, it provides
farmers with a way of making sense of disease on their farm and in
their local area. C status also appears to contribute to the goal of
preventing cattle movements that could translocate bTB. Farmers
frequently refer to C status to make judgements about the safety of
other herds and give status to those farmers who have been free
from disease for many years. In this sense, C status has potential to
allow farmers to reﬂect on the ‘right’ farming practices in relation
to bTB and guide their farming behaviour.
4.2. The limits to C status
The potential for C status to create biosecurity citizenship is
nevertheless mediated by farmers' own understandings of disease
that are linked to their place-based experiences of disease, and
their social attachments to Karamea. In particular, thematic analysis
reveals four key ways in which farmers' spatial understandings of
disease modify the meaning and utility of C status.
4.2.1. Stress, disease and ‘going over the hill’
Firstly, when judging stock, farmers make assessments of their
disease resistance based on their regional provenance. Farmers
commonly referred toWest Coast cattle as beingmuch hardier than
cattle from ‘over the hill’ in the neighbouring region of Canterbury.
As one farmer explained, life for cattle on the West Coast is hard: if
they go ‘over the hill’2 they thrive and are incredibly productive.
This meant that farmers in Canterbury would often take a com-
mercial attitude towards lower status cattle on the West Coast:
their disease status was off-set against the productivity gains once
they hadmoved over the hill. Farmers on theWest Coast recognised
that this might cause them a problem if those cattle disclosed bTB
infection at a test after they had moved. Indeed many recounted
tales of how cattle from C10 herds that had moved to Canterbury
subsequently became infected. Some farmers said this prospect
worried them, but others suggested that it was down to theway the
disease worked. Speciﬁcally, the role of stress in cattle setting off
bTB which would occur as a result of the long journey to the Can-
tabrian plains. For example:separates the West Coast from Canterbury.
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Christchurch and they've been C14 and they show up with TB
whether the movement causes some sort of stress and it breaks out
…” (KF9, bTB status: infected, 150 cows)
At the same time, buying cattle in from low risk areas like
Canterbury was seen to be a risk by farmers not just because of the
stress of the movement, but also because of their naivety to bTB
and/or the stage of their lifecycle. For example, stress at particular
times in a cows' lifecycle was a factor in cattle reacting to the bTB
test:
“Its generally the 2 year olds not your rising 2s, it's the R3s. they are
in milk, its not generally the younger ones that have it, it's the two
year olds that have the heifer reaction. And that could be stress that
sets it off” (KF5, bTB status: C4, 180 cows)
Elsewhere, these lay understandings of disease have been found
to affect the extent towhich farmers engage in biosecurity practices
(Enticott, 2008). In Karamea, a similar trend was noticeable: beliefs
in stress and naivety also impacted upon the perception of C status
e the best cattle to buy were not always those that were highest
rated, but those that could ﬁt the conditions. On the one hand,
cattle from ‘over the hill’were ill-prepared for the conditions on the
West Coast. The wetter climate and harsher conditions meant that,
even though those cattle were often rated as C10, their production
would not be as good as local cows. As a result, farmers believed
that they would quickly be infected with bTB because of the stress
they would be under. These lay epidemiologies therefore modiﬁed
perceptions of disease risks within the C score. For example:
“We'd buy in local stock e always local but we did buy from
Christchurch occasionally, we bought cows but it seemed to be that
East coast cows never did very well on theWest coast in the harsher
conditions e West Coast cows would do well over in Canterbury,
but the other way it just didn't really work. We bought some very
good cows from Canterbury and they only ended up being average
cows. They don't like the weather” (KF12, bTB status: C3)
These assessments reveal how broader spatial judgements are
made about the safety of cattle, beyond the herd-level assessment
provided by C Status. In these assessments of stress and disease,
farmers refer to much broader infected and safe geographical areas
in which some cows are able to thrive and whilst others decline. In
part, these spatial assessments are built on the prevalence of dis-
ease and the extent of C10 farms. But they also reﬂect how farmers
view disease as embedded within a set of heterogeneous relations,
combining landscape, climate, farming systems and genetics. The
spread of disease was therefore understood in terms of disruptions
to these relations that came to construct these different disease
spaces, rather than simply reducing disease to a metric.4.2.2. Luck
The fate of cattle moving and succumbing to bTB despite good C
status highlights a second reason how C status can fail to inspire
biosecurity citizenship. Many farmers concluded that contracting
bTB was a matter of luck rather than anything related to their own
actions and practices. Farmers viewed themselves as lucky if they
avoided the disease and unlucky if they tested positive. Frequently,
they suggested that ‘there was no rhyme or reason’ to why they had
got bTB and others not. Farmers sought to detect spatial patterns in
the distribution of the disease or observe how the distribution of
the disease matched those suggested by vets but efforts to develop
disease rules were usually confounded. All farmers accepted thatwildlife (in this case possums) could spread bTB and that vectors
should be eradicated. However, the pattern of bTB reactions did not
appear to match the distribution of farms closest to the bush
(possum habitat). Farmers commented that whilst the disease may
have been conﬁned to certain areas in the past, the idea of ‘clean’
and ‘dirty’ areas was no longer true. Farms in areas previously
considered safee because of their distance from the bushe such as
the beach, were now home to several infected farms, whilst those
close to and in the bush were clear of bTB.
This confounding pattern appeared to conﬁrm farmers' beliefs
about their lack of control over bTB and the role of luck. If bTB
infection wasn't down to farming practices or location, then there
was little farmers could do about it. Some farmers pointed out that
cattle bought from C10 herds had come down with bTB once they
had moved. Others invested in additional controls, paid for pest
control and changed their management practices but still had bTB.
Whatever, they all felt they were unable to control the disease:
“Oh [we have no control] whatsoever. We've tried e like we are a
closed herd, and we've fenced a buffer zone with the cows next door
if they have TB, the possum guys come around here and do it, but
I've never seen a possum on this place and I don't think there's any
control over it” (KF14, bTB status: infected, 230 cows)
Instead, many farmers attributed their lack of control to the bTB
test failing to ﬁnd reactors hidden in the herd and which would
only react at certain points in their life. Farmers were well
acquainted with the inadequacies of the bTB test: cattle in Karamea
appear to suffer disproportionately from a nonspeciﬁc reaction to
the test. Young animals aged 2e3 years would react to the bTB test,
but a subsequent blood test would usually clear them and they
would be allowed to remain in the herd. Accordingly, farmers
generally believed these cattle to be free of disease. Older cattle that
reacted would be slaughtered as soon as possible because they
were believed to be more likely to have had the disease and may
have been hiding it for several years. Some farmers believed that
cattle in Karamea had developed immunity to the testing which
allowed them to keep spreading the disease. The level of the dis-
ease combined with the unpredictability of the test meant that
many farmers believed they were always ‘one test away from being
infected’. For example:
“you are only one test away from being nothing aren't you? I think
you just don't set your hopes on it too high you don't go round
saying I'm C10 or whatever, but you are only one test away from
not being and in Karamea it's quite likely you are going to get it.
[C10 is] nothing to get excited by” (KF14, bTB status: infected, 230
cows)
In this context of disease unpredictability, C status lost its value
to Karamea farmers. The inability to control the disease, combined
with the problems associated with diagnostics, meant that C status
was not a reﬂection on a farmers' ability, their commitment to
biosecurity, or of the disease status of their cattle. Indeed, many
farmers suggested that the amount of testing conducted in Kar-
ameawasmore of an indication of the safety of the cattle than from
other parts of the country. For these farmers then, there were
minimal differences between herds rated C1, C5 or C10. As one
farmer stated: “There's nothing.Well it's only a number, yeah. I mean
clear is clear as far as I'm concerned”. As another farmer said, C status
could provide no guarantees or guide to the problem of bTB:
“I'd say that if you are C10 now then it's probably down to more
good luck than good management because it's become more of an
issue over the last 10 years … and if people have managed to get
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more than anything and they should count themselves lucky really
that they didn't get it” (KF15, bTB status: infected, 340 cows)4.2.3. Local embeddedness
A third reason why C status failed to matter to farmers was that
many had already adapted their business to deal with the conse-
quences of an unexpected bTB breakdown. Given the history of bTB
in Karamea, many farmers had long since adapted their businesses
in order to live with disease and the problems it brought. Farming
systems that involved breeding replacements rather than buying
cattle, deliberately overstocking to cope with wastage from bTB
tests, and not selling animals to other areas were established
practices amongst the long-standing farmers in the area. However,
farmers that had recently moved to Karamea did not always
employ these tactics. Indeed, farmers' personal attachment to
Karamea played an important role in creating these tactics and
diminishing the meaning of C status. Most of the farms in Karamea
are family owned and have been in the same family's hands for
generations. Few, if any, of these farmers have plans to sell up and
move away: the community is based on continuity rather than
change. Moreover, the isolation of Karamea helps to keep farmers
in the community. Farmers spoke of ‘being here for the long haul’,
whilst the isolation meant that farming had its own unique culture
of self-sufﬁciency. Most farmers had all the machinery they needed
and the distance from Canterbury meant that farmers adopted a
‘make do and mend’ policy rather thanwait several days for supplies
to ﬁx any problems.
In this social and geographical context, the importance of C
status declined. The importance of place attachment and the
practices adopted to cope with the loss of C status reinforced the
effect of luck and chance and the lack of incentive to improve one's
C status, as it said nothing of a farmer's ability or contribution to
biosecurity citizenship:
“It would be nice but its not something I sort of dwell on, its just the
way it is. It won't affect my income, it wont affect my way of
farming if I was a C5. The cows might be worth a little bit more but
Im not going to sell them so it's a low priority” (K7, bTB status: C1,
240 cows)
By contrast, for those farmers without ties to Karamea, and for
whom expansion and development were signiﬁcant motivations in
farming, the impact to their C status from bTB was one reason why
they may seek to move out of the area to farm. For example:
“Put it this way, one of the reasons for us to go, it would be
imperative that we went to an area with C10 after being in a TB
area because the opportunities to trade stock because of the
technologies we've got with sexed semen and embryo transplants
and the rest of it, to be able to rear more stock and make the farm
more proﬁtable then it'd be a major consideration to go to an area
that has a long history of being clear for TB” (KF15, bTB status:
infected, 340 cows)
Local farming practices have therefore evolved around the
management of bTB that affect the ability of market instruments
like C status to impact upon biosecurity citizenship. Karamea's
isolation and the desire to contribute to and be part of the local
community conspire to limit the meaning of C status in shaping
biosecurity behaviour. This does not mean that achieving C10 is not
seen as desirable, but that the speciﬁc conditions of bTB in Karamea
mean that it has become increasingly irrelevant: the metrics do notﬁt the socio-spatial circumstances to which they are applied.4.2.4. Trust and marginality
Themarginality of farming in Karameamediated themeaning of
C status in other ways too. For Karamea farmers, C status had sig-
niﬁcance not just at a farm or local scale, but also at a national scale
where it came to symbolise their marginality to national disease
control efforts. To understand this national dimension to C status
requires an understanding of the governance of the disease across
New Zealand. Unlike much of the rest of New Zealand, the level of
bTB on theWest Coast remains high. For farmers on theWest Coast,
this situation is reminiscent of their relative isolation from the rest
of New Zealand and raises concerns that they are not receiving their
fair share of attempts to eradicate the disease. The fact that Kar-
amea was extremely isolated e accessible only by one road and
100 kms from the nearest town the other side of a mountain ewas
of considerable concern to farmers. They could not understand why
bTB was still a big problem despite the successful use of the same
control mechanisms elsewhere in the country. Many thought that
they had been abandoned by the AHB who had put Karamea in a
‘too difﬁcult box’, preferring to invest in disease control in other
areas. The failure to reduce bTB in Karamea and the West Coast
worried many farmers that in its bid for bTB freedom, the AHB
would somehow separate Karamea from the rest of the country. By
removing Karamea from the bTB national statistics, this would
allow the AHB to claim that New Zealand had eradicated the dis-
ease. For example:
“I do worry that as the rest of the country gets clear of TB they'll
look at Karamea and think right that's moving up our average, we'll
just close that off” (K1, bTB status: infected, 210 cows)
For these farmers, the C classiﬁcation was therefore not a
reﬂection on their own personal disease status, but reﬂected the
national effort being put intomanaging the disease. C status did not
suggest how many years a farm had been disease free, nor describe
a farmers' commitment to biosecurity, but instead symbolised the
extent to which they felt the disease was being successfully
managed at a national scale and preserve their identity as farmers.
Thus, in reﬂecting on the desirability of being C10, farmers viewed
that status as being a proxy for the extent towhich the problemwas
being dealt with as a whole, rather than being stuck in a cycle of
reinfection:
“[Being C10] would mean that [the AHB] would be on top of TB,
instead of getting towards C4 or C5 and then getting infected, and
suspended” (KF9, bTB status: C4, 150 cows)5. Conclusion
Market instruments and their metrological systems like C status
have the potential to create forms of biosecurity citizenship and
guide farmers' behaviour towards better disease management
practices. In an era when neoliberal governance is replacing tradi-
tional forms in the governance of animal disease, such MIs ﬁt
perfectly with the ethos of voluntarism and deregulation. However,
the reception of MIs on the ground and their role in shaping and
farmers' biosecurity practices is not simple. At one level, C status in
New Zealand is used readily by farmers to assess risks of cattle
movements to and from different herd statuses. Farmers report C
status creating value and shaping their behaviour directly and
indirectly. The language of C status has been readily adopted by
farmers and has become part of the everyday language of farming.
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the same meaning. This is because farmers' experiences of disease
leads them to generate complex spatial understandings of disease
in which disease risks are situated in a set of social, environmental
and economic relationships. At a local level, farmers' place-based
experiences of disease e the lack of certainties in testing and
infection e and their embeddedness in the local community, places
limits on the utility of market instruments like C to inspire bio-
security citizenship. It is not that farmers do not think biosecurity
citizenship is important e far from it. Rather, in areas of high bTB
incidence, C status is no accurate guide to who should have bTB or
why they have got it. Aspiring to be C10 appears to be irrelevant: it
no more reﬂects good or bad farming that it does pro/anti-
biosecure citizenship.
At a national scale, C status therefore comes to reﬂect farmers'
conﬁdence in the disease control system as a whole. Rather than
reﬂecting what it means for local farmers, C becomes a proxy for
the effort that national bodies are putting into disease control in
marginal places and the extent to which isolated communities
remain part of it. In effect, C status is an indicator of the extent to
which farmers feel they are part of a national disease eradication
programme, or isolated from it e both physically and practically.
The case of Karamea is unique and further research is required
to assess how animal disease MIs work in different disease contexts
and farming systems. For example, how do RBTs function in low
risk areas amongst large-scale commercial farms? Nevertheless, it
is notable that the ﬁndings from Karamea also reﬂect other similar
research. Firstly, studies of MIs for different agricultural policies
likewise conclude that the adoption of MIs is context dependent
and related to existing practices and institutional relations (Higgins
et al., 2012). However, this analysis also demonstrates how different
spatial imaginations of disease, and their embeddedness and
attachment to place, inﬂuences the meaning of MIs and subsequent
disease practice. In the context of disease management, at least, it is
not so much that MIs are ignored, more that their meaning adapts
to local circumstances. The extent of factors such as place attach-
ment should be investigated for other MIs that relate to disease
behaviour. Secondly, despite the unique circumstances of Karamea,
farmers' understandings of disease share similar characteristics to
those found in other studies of animal disease. In particular, the
signiﬁcance of luck and trust in government have been recognised
in other studies in other countries, despite having different gover-
nance arrangements (Enticott, 2008). This suggests that encour-
aging farmers to adopt disease prevention faces systemic
challenges relating to trust in government and the handling of
uncertainty in diagnosing disease. Thus, whilst MIs may be part of a
new neoliberal approach to managing animal disease, it is likely
that policy makers will continue to face broader questions about
how best to govern animal disease.
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